

SECOM-D-217
21 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

Special Assistant to the DCI for
Compartmentation

FROM:

APEX Security Advisor

SUBJECT: Interchangeability of Access Approvals

REFERENCE: Comments Offered by Contractors at
APEX Seminar, 19 May 1980

1. Action Requested: This memorandum is addressed to both Chairman of the DCI's Security Committee and the Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation in recognition of the dual interest in the idea of the interchangeability of access approvals, and in acknowledgement of the distinct but related authorities of each addressee in this matter. It makes a proposal that needs approval and support of both addressees. The proposal is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Background: At the 19 May 1980 APEX Seminar for industrial representatives, a long standing idea was again raised with the expressed desire that it be reconsidered within the APEX effort. The concept is that once an individual has been granted a specific access approval (let us say to SI), that it be considered valid for all agencies. One contractor representative commented that some of his personnel hold as many as five SI access approvals from as many agencies.

Beyond the simple surface statement that a person may have an SI registered with five different agencies, is the implication that each agency conducted a background investigation, adjudicated the results, briefed the individual, obtained a non-disclosure agreement, and believes it exercises security cognizance over him in connection with travel restrictions, foreign contacts, realities briefings and debriefing, alien marriage (Lord forbid), and ultimately, procedures associated with termination of access approval.

This problem, and it is a problem for our limited contractual base, is not new. Attempts to resolve it in the late 60's and early 70's were rebuffed by several agencies as being intrusive. This was probably a reflection of departmental distrust and a convoluted invocation of the need-to-know principle. The efforts were so light that I can find no papers on them. What is new is the opportunity to again address the matter in a time when greater appreciation exists of departmental adherence to a common personnel security standard (DCID 1/14).

3. Discussion: This problem does not exist in government during employment. It does arise in a transitional period between government and civilian employment when the individual is a government contracted employee and moves part time into industry. Examples are some of our recent retirees who returned almost immediately after retirement in a part time contractor status, and desired to do part time contracting for other government agencies or with a civilian outfit that had government contracts ([] and [] are examples).

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There is reason to believe that the members of the Intelligence Community are aware of a problem, and there are indications that they are moving informally to solve it.

CIA, in house, no longer requires additional security action (either BI or file review) when an employee is nominated for incremental SCI access within 5 years of his last BI.

There is reason to believe that the whole community works this way.

The SPECLE register made this possible. The 4-C will permit expanded use of a data bank on who holds what clearances.

Within government there is an expanded acceptance of the "term certification". Individuals assigned from one agency to another do so in essence with tickets on their back. The FBI holds [] access approvals and Air Force holds Col. Newman's, although they are physically working on the Security Committee Staff.

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These indications do not enumerate solutions to all existing problems that face us if we try to carry them over to industry. Among the unresolved problems are:

- Turndowns in industry. While we have an operating procedure among agencies to inform each other of turndowns, the alert does not normally include details for the action. Maybe we would not want to pass such detail even if we could. However, since the Community members have demonstrated a willingness to accept certifications without looking behind them, would there be unacceptable barriers against mutual acceptances of turndowns?

- DCID 1/14 calls for minimum standards. CIA and NSA interpret the requirement for a personal interview as a polygraph interview. NSA routinely insists on polygraphing all contractor employees. CIA is moving toward expanding its industrial polygraph program. Will CIA and NSA accept certification of SCI approval of a contractor's employee previously granted by a non-polygraphing agency such as DIA or State or the FBI? The alternatives seem to be to broaden DCID 1/14 mandating polygraph, or dropping the CIA and NSA polygraph programs in industry.

4. Proposal: That the Security Committee staff draft a proposal recognizing the problem of multiple departmental access approvals in industry and recommending solutions aimed at creating in industry, procedures similar to those in government related to certification among agencies of SCI approvals.

If this suggestion is endorsed informally by the Chairman, DCI Security Committee and the Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation, the Security Committee staff will undertake preparation of a draft proposal against an early August deadline and recommend it be presented to Security Committee members at the August SECOM meeting.

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CONCUR:

Chairman, DCI Security Committee

Date

Special Assistant to DCI/Compartmentation

Date

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